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Abstract 
For societies to produce or safeguard public goods, costly voluntary contributions are often 
required. From the perspective of each individual, however, it is advantageous not to volun-
teer such contributions, in the hope that other individuals will carry the associated costs. This 
conflict can be modeled as a volunteer’s dilemma. To encourage rational individuals to make 
voluntary contributions, a government or other social organizations can offer rewards, to be 
shared among the volunteers. Here we apply such shared rewarding to the generalized 
𝑁-person volunteer’s dilemma, in which a threshold number of volunteers is required for 
producing the public good. By means of theoretical and numerical analyses, we show that 
without shared rewarding only two evolutionary outcomes are possible: full defection or co-
existence of volunteers and non-volunteers. We show that already small rewards destabilize 
full defection, stabilizing small fractions of volunteers instead. Furthermore, at these interme-
diate reward levels, we find a hysteresis effect such that increasing or decreasing group sizes 
can trigger different social outcomes. In particular, when group size is increased, the fraction 
of volunteers first increases gradually before jumping up abruptly; when group size is then 
decreased again, the fraction of volunteers not only remains high, but even continues to in-
crease. As the shared reward is increased beyond a critical level, the bistablitity underlying 
this hysteresis effect vanishes altogether, and only a single social outcome remains, corre-
sponding to the stable coexistence of volunteers and non-volunteers. We find that this critical 
level of shared rewarding is relatively small compared to the total cost of contributing to the 
public good. These results show that the introduction of shared rewarding is remarkably ef-
fective in overcoming defection traps in the generalized volunteer’s dilemma. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the emergence and stability of cooperation among rational individuals is a 
central challenge in evolutionary biology, as well as in the social sciences. Evolutionary game 
theory provides a common mathematical framework for interpreting the evolution of coopera-
tion. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game and its 𝑁-person variant are the most com-
monly employed games for studying this challenge (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Maynard 
Smith, 1982; Hauert et al., 2002; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Nowak, 2006; Hauert et al., 2007; 
Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Santos et al., 2008; Traulsen et al., 2009; Sigmund et al., 2010; Perc et 
al., 2013). However, there are some social dilemmas concerning altruistic behavior for which 
different games offer more appropriate models. In particular, the volunteer’s dilemma game 
has been proposed as another important paradigm (Diekmann, 1985). 
The volunteer’s dilemma is defined as follows (Diekmann, 1985): members of a group 
can volunteer to pay a small cost (Volunteer, a cooperative strategy) or avoid to pay the cost 
(Ignore, a defective strategy) towards the production or maintenance of a public good. If at 
least one individual chooses to volunteer, the public good is produced and benefits all indi-
viduals in the group, irrespective of their contributions. In contrast, if nobody volunteers, the 
public good is not produced, and all group members pay a cost that is higher than that of vol-
unteering. Clearly, a volunteer benefits from his or her action if nobody else volunteers, 
whereas such a voluntary investment is wasted if another group member volunteers as well 
(Archetti, 2009b). This volunteer’s dilemma game has been extended to the more general case 
in which more than one volunteer is required for producing the public good; the resultant 
game is also known as a threshold public good game (Myatt and Wallace, 2008; Archetti, 
2009a; Boza and Számadó, 2010). 
The volunteer’s dilemma and its generalization can be applied to many situations 
studied in the social sciences (Diekmann, 1985; Diekmann, 1993), such as volunteering work 
in charitable organizations, cleaning shared accommodation, or getting up at night to placate a 
crying baby (Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1996; Otsubo and Rapoport, 2008). Moreover, the vol-
unteer’s dilemma is relevant also in the context of evolutionary biology (Goeree and Holt, 
2005; Archetti, 2009a,b; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011; Archetti, 2011): a typical example 
from the biological context is a population of social animals using alarm calls to warn others 
of predators. In such a situation, the individual raising the alarm promotes the collective secu-
rity of its population from predation, but individually incurs non-negligible costs, because 
raising an alarm often increases the risk of being targeted by a predator. 
Previous studies have examined different factors affecting cooperation in volunteer’s 
dilemmas, such as group size (Franzen, 1995; Weesie and Franzen, 1998; Archetti, 2009b; 
Brännström et al., 2011), individual vigilance (Archetti, 2011), and nonlinear benefits (Do et 
al., 2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011). Specifically, it was found that the fraction of volun-
teers decreases with group size, so that larger groups tend to under-produce the public good 
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(Franzen, 1995; Weesie and Franzen, 1998; Archetti, 2009b; Brännström et al., 2011). Above 
a certain group size, reducing an individual’s vigilance can induce other players to volunteer 
more often (Archetti, 2011). Moreover, incorporating nonlinear returns on investments allows 
cooperation to be sustained, so that cooperators and free-riders are expected to coexist in a 
stable mixed equilibrium (Archetti and Scheuring, 2011). 
In this study, we incorporate a rewarding mechanism into the volunteer’s dilemma. 
Our motivation for this extension stems from the observation that in many real-world situa-
tions voluntary contributions are maintained by a reward system providing incentives for 
volunteering. For example, companies or enterprises reward groups of employees for good 
performance in teamwork, and volunteers at events such as Olympic Games receive favorable 
public recognition. Furthermore, governments or other social organizations involved with 
public security enact regulations that reward and protect citizens who voluntarily strengthen 
the fight against crime (Marin and Harder, 1994). These volunteers can thus become role 
models for other people, which further stimulates voluntary behavior. 
In this study, we assume that volunteers in a group receive a certain reward from an 
external pool of resources that is shared among them. We study how the introduction of such 
shared rewarding influences the equilibrium fraction of volunteers in large well-mixed popu-
lations, and what level of rewarding is needed to overcome defection traps in these systems. 
We find that the introduction of shared rewarding has two interesting consequences. First, 
shared rewarding leads to a hysteresis effect under which the highest level of volunteering is 
reached by first increasing and then decreasing group size. Second, even small total rewards 
suffice to stabilize the coexistence of volunteers and non-volunteers, and are thus surprisingly 
efficient in robustly overcoming defection traps. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Volunteer’s dilemma 
We consider the generalized 𝑁-person volunteer’s dilemma, describing the interaction of 
individuals in groups of  𝑁 (𝑁 ≥ 2) players. In each round of the game, an interaction group 
is assembled by randomly drawing 𝑁 individuals from a large (infinite) well-mixed popula-
tion (Hauert et al., 2002; Hauert et al., 2006). Each player can choose between the strategies 
Volunteer or Ignore. The public good is produced if at least 𝑘 (1 ≤ 𝑘 < 𝑁) individuals 
choose to volunteer. The cost of volunteering is 𝑐, relative to a baseline payoff of 1; volun-
teers incur this cost irrespective of whether or not the public good is produced. A failure of 
producing the public good imposes a cost 𝑎 > 𝑐 on each player in the group. As a result, the 
payoffs of the strategies Volunteer and Ignore are given by 
 𝑃V(𝑀) = �1 − 𝑐  if 𝑀 ≥ 𝑘,1 − 𝑎 − 𝑐  if 𝑀 < 𝑘, (1a) 
and 
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 𝑃I(𝑀) = �1  if 𝑀 ≥ 𝑘,1 − 𝑎  if 𝑀 < 𝑘, (1b) 
respectively, where 𝑀 is the number of volunteers in the group. For 𝑐 > 0, 𝑃I(𝑀) thus 
always exceeds 𝑃V(𝑀). 
It is worth pointing out that payoffs in the volunteer’s dilemma can alternatively be 
described by assuming a cost resulting from the public good’s absence (as above) or a benefit 
resulting from its presence (Archetti, 2011). The evolutionary dynamics reported below are 
unaffected by this alternative parameterization. 
2.2. Shared rewarding 
We extend the 𝑁-person volunteer’s dilemma specified above by introducing shared reward-
ing. For this we assume that the volunteers in an interaction group in each round share a total 
reward 𝛿 (0 < 𝛿 < 𝑁𝑐). Whether 𝛿 is provided from an external pool of resources or 
through compulsory contributions made by all players has no bearing on the evolutionary dy-
namics reported below. 
For this generalized volunteer’s dilemma with shared rewarding, the average payoffs 
of the strategies Volunteer and Ignore are given by 
 𝑃V = ∑ �𝑁 − 1𝑀 �𝑁−1𝑀=0 𝑥𝑀(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−1−𝑀 ⋅ [𝑃V(𝑀 + 1) + 𝛿𝑀+1] 
 = ∑ �𝑁 − 1
𝑀
�𝑁−1𝑀=𝑘−1 𝑥
𝑀(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−1−𝑀 ⋅ (1 − 𝑐) 
 +[1 − ∑ �𝑁 − 1
𝑀
�𝑁−1𝑀=𝑘−1 𝑥
𝑀(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−1−𝑀] ⋅ (1 − 𝑎 − 𝑐) 
 +∑ �𝑁 − 1
𝑀
�𝑁−1𝑀=0 𝑥
𝑀(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−1−𝑀 ⋅ 𝛿
𝑀+1
 (2a) 
and 
 𝑃I = ∑ �𝑁 − 1𝑀 �𝑁−1𝑀=0 𝑥𝑀(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−1−𝑀𝑃I(𝑀) 
 = ∑ �𝑁 − 1
𝑀
�𝑁−1𝑀=𝑘 𝑥
𝑀(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−1−𝑀 ⋅ 1 
 +[1 − ∑ �𝑁 − 1
𝑀
�𝑁−1𝑀=𝑘 𝑥
𝑀(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−1−𝑀] ⋅ (1 − 𝑎), (2b) 
where 𝑥 is the current fraction of volunteers in the population. 
2.3. Replicator dynamics 
For studying the evolutionary dynamics of 𝑥, we use the replicator equation (Hofbauer and 
Sigmund, 1998), 
 ?̇? = 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)(𝑃V − 𝑃I), 
where the dot denotes the derivative with respect to time 𝑡, ?̇? = d𝑥/d𝑡. 
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In addition to the boundary equilibria at 𝑥 = 0 and 𝑥 = 1, interior equilibria are 
found by equating 𝑃V and 𝑃I, 
 𝑃V − 𝑃I = �𝑁 − 1𝑘 − 1� 𝑥𝑘−1(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−𝑘𝑎 − 𝑐 + 𝛿 1−(1−𝑥)𝑁𝑁𝑥 = 0. 
We introduce the reward ratio 
 𝑝 = 𝛿
𝑁𝑐
  (0 < 𝑝 < 1) to characterize the magnitude of the total reward 𝛿 relative to the maximal 
total volunteering cost 𝑁𝑐, which yields 
 𝑃V − 𝑃I = �𝑁 − 1𝑘 − 1� 𝑥𝑘−1(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−𝑘 − 𝑐 𝑥−𝑝+𝑝(1−𝑥)𝑁𝑥 . 
The replicator equation can thus be written as 
 ?̇? = (1 − 𝑥)𝐹(𝑥), (3a) 
with 
 𝐹(𝑥) = �𝑁 − 1
𝑘 − 1� 𝑥𝑘(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−𝑘𝑎 − 𝑐𝑓(𝑥) (3b) 
and 
 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 − 𝑝 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑥)𝑁 . (3c) 
Below, we use Eq. (3) to study equilibria in the fraction of volunteers, in particular as a func-
tion of the reward ratio, by theoretical and numerical analyses. 
3. Results 
3.1. Defection traps 
As a baseline for studying the impacts of shared rewarding, we start with results for the effect 
of the cost ratio 𝑐/𝑎 on the social dynamics of the 𝑁-person volunteer’s dilemma without 
shared rewarding (𝑝 = 0). Fig. 1a shows that, depending on this cost ratio, beside the two 
boundary equilibria at 𝑥 = 0 (stable) and 𝑥 = 1 (unstable), the population can have two 
additional, interior equilibria, one stable and the other unstable [3]. In particular, the unstable 
interior equilibrium, if it exists, divides the range  [0,1] of 𝑥 into two basins of attraction. 
As the cost ratio increases, the stable interior equilibrium decreases, while the unstable interi-
or equilibrium increases, until they eventually collide at 𝑐/𝑎 = (𝑘 − 1)/(𝑁 − 1) in a sad-
dle-node bifurcation (Archetti and Scheuring, 2011). For higher cost ratios, there are no inte-
rior equilibria, and the only stable equilibrium is at 𝑥 = 0, corresponding to the complete 
absence of volunteers (Fig. 1a). 
These results highlight the existence of defection traps in the generalized volunteer’s 
dilemma: for cost ratios below (𝑘 − 1)/(𝑁 − 1), a population initially lacking volunteers 
(𝑥 = 0) is trapped in that state, even though a stable equilibrium with a considerable fraction 
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of volunteers exists. The stable interior equilibrium, however, can only be reached when the 
initial fraction of volunteers exceeds the interior unstable equilibrium. 
Against this baseline expectation, we can now study the impacts of shared rewarding, 
depending on the reward ratio 𝑝. We can distinguish three qualitatively different cases. First, 
for very small reward ratios (𝑝 < 1/𝑁), the configuration of equilibria remains unaffected by 
shared rewarding (Fig. 1d). A corresponding proof is provided in Appendix A. Second, for 
slightly larger reward ratios, a saddle-node bifurcation occurs, through which two different 
configurations of equilibria may arise (Appendix A): for large cost ratios 𝑐/𝑎 the population 
possesses only one stable interior equilibrium with a small fraction of volunteers, whereas for 
small cost ratios it also possesses a second stable interior equilibrium with a large fraction of 
volunteers (Fig. 1g). In either case, the boundary equilibrium 𝑥 = 0 is destabilized by the 
shared rewarding (Fig. 1g). Third, for even larger reward ratios, there exists only one stable 
interior equilibrium, at which the fraction of volunteers decreases with increasing cost ratio 
(Fig. 1j; Appendix A). 
We now consider the effect of the threshold number 𝑘 of volunteers. Without shared 
rewarding and for 𝑘 = 1, our model recovers the classical volunteer’s dilemma (Diekmann, 
1985). In this situation, there is only one interior equilibrium at 𝑥 = 1 − (𝑐/𝑎)1/(𝑁−1) (Ar-
chetti and Scheuring, 2011). For 𝑘 > 1, two interior equilibria exist, one stable and the other 
unstable, both of which increase with increasing 𝑘. The fraction of volunteers at the stable 
equilibrium approaches 𝑥 = 1 as 𝑘 reaches 𝑁 − 1 (Fig. 1b). As for the impact of shared 
rewarding, the dependence on 𝑘 of the long-term dynamics of volunteering in the population 
is not changed as long as the reward ratio 𝑝 is small (Fig. 1e). In contrast, for larger reward 
ratios (Fig. 1h,k), small threshold numbers 𝑘 result in a single interior equilibrium that is 
stable, whereas larger threshold numbers result in three interior equilibria, two of which are 
stable. The critical value of 𝑘 separating these two cases increases with the reward ratio. 
Fig. 1b,e,h,k highlight how defection traps can be overcome through sufficient shared re-
warding, as long as the threshold number of volunteers is not too high. 
Furthermore, we investigate the effect of group size 𝑁. Without shared rewarding, in-
creasing group size decreases the two interior equilibria (Fig. 1c). Shared rewarding results in 
a stable interior equilibrium at which the fraction of volunteers approaches 𝑝 as the group 
size is increased (Fig. 1f,i,l). When the reward ratio 𝑝 is small, two interior equilibria exist 
for small groups, one stable and the other unstable (Fig. 1f); for intermediate groups, an addi-
tional stable interior equilibrium emerges (Fig. 1f), and for large groups, this collides with the 
unstable interior equilibrium, leaving only a single stable interior equilibrium (Fig. 1f). When 
the reward ratio is increased, the aforementioned three interior equilibria exist only for very 
small groups (Fig. 1i); otherwise, there is a single stable interior equilibrium (Fig. 1i). And 
when the reward ratio is increased further, there is a single stable interior equilibrium for all 
group sizes (Fig. 1l). 
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It is worth pointing out three surprising impacts of altering group size. First, when 
there are two stable interior equilibria, the lower one gradually increases with group size 
(Fig. 1f,i). Second, as group size is increased further, the lower stable interior equilibrium 
disappears in a saddle-node bifurcation and the population abruptly jumps to what was the 
higher stable interior equilibrium (Fig. 1f,i) and now becomes the only stable interior equilib-
rium (Fig. 1l). In both cases, therefore, larger group sizes promote volunteering, contrary to 
what might naively be expected and what applies in the absence of shared rewarding (Franzen, 
1995; Weesie and Franzen, 1998; Archetti, 2009b; Brännström et al., 2011). Third, taken to-
gether, the two highlighted effects yield a hysteresis effect that can be used to maximize the 
fraction of volunteers: for groups of intermediate size, the highest stable level of volunteering 
is reached by first increasing and then decreasing group size (Fig. 1f,i). 
3.2. Cusp bifurcation 
For understanding the core phenomenon underlying the seemingly intricate dependencies re-
vealed above, it is helpful to integrate into a single diagram the dependences of the stationary 
fraction 𝑥 of volunteers on the cost ratio 𝑐/𝑎 on the one hand and on the reward ratio 𝑝 on 
the other. The result is shown in Fig. 2a and can be summarized as follows. 
First, for high values of 𝑝, and irrespective of 𝑐/𝑎, only a single stable interior equi-
librium exits, which gradually increases to 𝑥 = 1 as the reward ratio is increased to 𝑝 = 1. 
Second, three interior equilibria coexist only at low values of 𝑐/𝑎 and 𝑝, highlighted 
by the grey region in Fig. 2c. As we have explained above, such combinations of 𝑐/𝑎 and 𝑝 
imply defection traps. 
Third, as either 𝑐/𝑎 or 𝑝 are increased from within this region, the unstable interior 
equilibrium collides with one of the two stable interior equilibria: with the upper one as 𝑐/𝑎 
is increased, and with the lower one as 𝑝 is increased. In Fig. 2c, the two lines along which 
these collisions happen, through saddle-node bifurcations, are shown in black. 
Fourth, where these two lines connect, indicated by the filled circle in Fig. 2a,c, both 
aforementioned bifurcations occur together. This means that all three interior equilibria col-
lide at one value of 𝑥, leaving behind a single stable interior equilibrium at that value of 𝑥, 
and thus eliminating the defection trap. This occurs for combinations of 𝑐/𝑎 and 𝑝 situated 
right at the cusp of the defection-trap region shown in Fig. 2c, and amounts to what is there-
fore known as a cusp bifurcation. Consequently, when the reward ratio 𝑝 exceeds the reward 
ratio 𝑝cusp at the cusp, defection traps cannot occur for any value of the cost ratio 𝑐/𝑎. This 
means that 𝑝cusp determines a critical level of shared rewarding beyond which defection 
traps in the generalized volunteer’s dilemma are safely overcome. 
As long as the group size 𝑁 exceeds the threshold number 𝑘, 𝑝cusp remains smaller 
than 1. Fig. 2b-j show how the defection-trap region expands, and 𝑝cusp increases, with in-
creasing 𝑘 and decreasing 𝑁. 
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3.3. Critical reward ratio 
While adopting the reward ratio 𝑝cusp safely eliminates defection traps for any level of the 
cost ratio 𝑐/𝑎, thus the prescribed reward ratio is overly conservative: this is because except 
at the cusp itself the critical reward ratio 𝑝c that eliminates defection traps for a given level 
of the cost ratio 𝑐/𝑎 is always lower than the reward ratio at the cusp, 𝑝c < 𝑝cusp. 
In Fig. 3a-c, we therefore examine how the critical reward ratio 𝑝c varies with the 
cost ratio 𝑐/𝑎, the threshold number 𝑘 of volunteers, and the group size 𝑁. We find that 𝑝c 
increases with 𝑘, 𝑐/𝑎, and 𝑁. This is compatible with an understanding that producing a 
public good is more difficult when it requires a higher threshold number of volunteers or a 
higher cost ratio (Souza et al., 2009; Boza and Számadó, 2010; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011), 
or when larger group size inhibits the emergence of volunteering (Franzen, 1995; Weesie and 
Franzen, 1998; Archetti, 2009b). Moreover, for many combinations of 𝑐/𝑎, 𝑘, and 𝑁, the 
critical reward ratio 𝑝c is relatively small compared to the total cost of contributing to the 
public good, as measured by the cost ratio 𝑐/𝑎. This opens up opportunities for overcoming 
defection traps at little extra cost invested into shared rewarding. 
To better understand the beneficial effects of shared rewarding, Fig. 3d-f show how 
the fraction of volunteers varies with 𝑐/𝑎, 𝑘, and 𝑁. We find that the fraction of volunteers 
decreases with 𝑐/𝑎 and 𝑁, but increases with 𝑘. Moreover, for many combinations of 𝑐/𝑎, 
𝑘, and 𝑁, the fraction of volunteers is relatively high. The aforementioned opportunities for 
overcoming defection traps thus go hand in hand with possibilities of achieving relatively 
high levels of volunteering, all at little extra cost invested into shared rewarding. 
To further explore these options for garnering high returns on small extra investments, 
we define the relative gain of shared rewarding as the proportion between the achieved frac-
tion of volunteers and the required reward ratio. Fig. 3g-i show how this consideration helps 
identify windows of opportunity for cost ratios 𝑐/𝑎 that are smaller than about 0.4 and for 
threshold ratios 𝑘/𝑁 that are smaller than about 0.5. Within these windows, shared reward-
ing is particularly efficient. 
4. Discussion 
In this work, we have incorporated shared rewarding into the generalized 𝑁-person volun-
teer’s dilemma, and have studied for the first time the resultant evolutionary dynamics of 
volunteering in infinite well-mixed populations. We have found that small reward ratios, on 
the order of the inverse of the group size, already enable the persistence of volunteers.  
At intermediate reward ratios, the evolutionary dynamics are bistable and exhibit a 
hysteresis. In this regime, it is possible to move from a state with a low proportion of volun-
teers to a state with a high proportion of volunteers by first increasing the group size beyond a 
certain threshold and then decreasing it back to the original level.  
Page 10 of 22 
When the reward ratio is increased further beyond a critical value, defection traps dis-
appear and the evolutionary dynamics always approach a state with a high proportion of vol-
unteers. For a wide range of parameter combinations, we observe that the critical value of the 
reward ratio is reached while the amount of rewarding is still relatively small in comparison 
to the value of the public good that is produced. This highlights shared rewarding as a power-
ful mechanism for promoting voluntary contributions to the common good of societies.  
4.1. Comparison with related studies 
It is worthwhile to point out that, in the generalized 𝑁-person volunteer’s dilemma, the public 
good is produced or safeguarded as a step function of individual contributions. This function 
thus differs from the linear function used in some previous works (Cuesta et al., 2008; Jimé-
nez et al., 2008; Jiménez et al., 2009) on the 𝑁-person prisoner’s dilemma game. In compar-
ison to the case considered here, the N-person prisoner’s dilemma can be considered as an 
extreme case, which − due to the assumed linearity − cannot capture the effects of thresh-
olds for the production of the public good. This explains the significantly higher levels of re-
wards that are needed to establish a significant cooperation level in the 𝑁-person prisoner’s 
dilemma game (Cuesta et al., 2008). The generalized 𝑁-person volunteer’s dilemma is a good 
approximation of general public goods games with nonlinear functions, e.g., the sigmoid 
function (Boza and Számadó, 2010; Frank, 2010; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011), in 
well-mixed populations. As in those general public goods games, we find that there exist de-
fection traps in the generalized volunteer’s dilemma which, as we show, shared rewarding can 
effectively overcome. 
The effects of rewarding on cooperation have already been investigated in several ear-
lier studies (Sigmund et al., 2001; Rand et al., 2009; Hauert, 2010; Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010; 
Szolnoki and Perc, 2010; Szolnoki and Perc, 2012; Milinski and Rockenbach, 2012). Howev-
er, these studies mainly examined peer rewarding, with rewarding contributors paying a per-
sonal cost to provide contributors with an additional benefit. Rewarding cooperation is expen-
sive in a population of contributors, but is cheap when everyone defects; hence, such reward-
ing can encourage cooperation. In the case of peer rewarding, players contributing to the 
common good but refusing to provide rewards achieve higher payoffs than players that re-
ward other players. They thus thwart the attempts to sustain cooperation based on rewards, 
implying a second-order rewarding dilemma (Hauert, 2010; Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010). In 
contrast to these earlier studies, the rewarding strategy we have considered here is not costly 
to players, and correspondingly, players cannot prevent rewards being distributed to volun-
teers as positive incentives. Hence, the shared rewarding considered here constitutes a form of 
institutional rewarding (Isakov and Rand, 2012; Cressman et al., 2012; Sasaki et al., 2012), 
which naturally avoids the emergence of second-order free-riders. Let us emphasize that even 
if all players need to pay an “entrance fee” (Sasaki et al., 2012) for enabling shared rewarding 
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(so that each player’s payoff is reduced by 𝑝𝑐), the evolutionary outcomes reported here will 
not be affected. 
4.2. Limitations and extensions 
In this work, we have studied shared rewarding under a variety of simplifying assumptions 
that could be relaxed or extended. First, following the traditional setting of evolutionary game 
theory, we have considered infinite well-mixed populations. Hence, a natural extension of our 
analyses is to consider the effects of finite population size (Pacheco et al., 2009; Souza et al., 
2009). Also, the proposed model does not include spatial structure (Sigmund et al., 2001), 
voluntary participation (Hauert et al., 2002), reputation (Hauert, 2010), or exploratory behav-
ior (Traulsen et al., 2009). In such more complex scenarios, the positive effect of shared re-
warding, leading to the avoidance of defections traps, may be further amplified. 
Second, we have assumed that volunteers can always receive a certain amount of re-
ward from an outside source, no matter whether the public good at stake is produced or not. 
However, in some situations volunteers receive such a reward only if they produce the public 
good. Hence, a promising extension of this work is to consider alternative funding structures 
for shared rewarding. 
Third, we have assumed that the total reward offered to the group of volunteers is 
equally shared within that group. As an alternative, it would be interesting to consider such 
rewards being distributed in proportion to the magnitude of contribution made by each volun-
teer. Naturally, this requires employing an extended theoretical framework in which contribu-
tions made to a public good are described as continuous variables (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005), 
instead of treating them are merely binary choices. 
Fourth, here we have examined the repercussions of shared rewarding assuming a 
threshold rule for the considered public good, which is either produced or not, depending on 
whether the number of volunteers exceeds a threshold. It will be interesting to relax this sim-
plifying assumption, for example, by replacing the considered step function with a sigmoidal 
function. 
Fifth, in view of recent advances concerning punishments, it remains to be seen how 
the findings we have reported are affected by the joint impacts of rewarding and punishing 
(Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010; Chen et al., 2013). It will also be worthwhile to explore the im-
plications of nonlinear cost-benefit functions and spatially structured populations (Szolnoki 
and Perc, 2010; Szolnoki and Perc, 2012). 
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Appendix A: Analysis of equilibria 
The replicator dynamics in Eq. (3) have two boundary equilibria: 𝑥 = 0 and 𝑥 = 1. Since 
the first term of 𝐹(𝑥)  is positive for all 𝑥 ∈ (0, 1), interior equilibria can exist only at 
frequencies 𝑥 at which 𝑓(𝑥) ≥ 0 (The interior equilibria of these dynamics are determined 
by the interior roots of 𝐹(𝑥) , as defined in Eq. (3b)). If 𝑁𝑝 ≤ 1 , 𝑓(𝑥) > 0  for all 
𝑥 ∈ (0, 1) ; otherwise, 𝑓(𝑥)  has a single interior root ?̅? ∈ (0,1) , with 𝑓(𝑥) > 0  for 
𝑥 ∈ (?̅?, 1) (Appendix B). 
 The analysis of the interior roots of 𝐹(𝑥) can be reduced to studying the slope and 
curvature of the function 𝐺(𝑥), defined as  
 𝐺(𝑥) = �𝑁 − 1
𝑘 − 1� 𝑥𝑘(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−𝑘/𝑓(𝑥), 
since 𝐹(𝑥) = 0 is equivalent to 𝐺(𝑥) = 𝑐/𝑎. We thus compute 
 𝐺'(𝑥) = �𝑁 − 1
𝑘 − 1� 𝑥𝑘−1(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−𝑘−1𝐷(𝑥)/𝑓2(𝑥) , 
where 
𝐷(𝑥) = 𝑥[𝑥 − 1 + 𝑁(𝑝 − 𝑥)] + 𝑘[𝑥 − 𝑝 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑥)𝑁]. 
This shows that the sign of 𝐺'(𝑥) is that of 𝐷(𝑥), which implies that the roots of 𝐺'(𝑥) and 
of 𝐷(𝑥) are identical. For later reference, we note that the first derivative of 𝐷(𝑥) is given 
by  
 𝐷'(𝑥) = 𝑘 − 1 + 𝑁(𝑝 − 2𝑥) − 𝑘𝑁𝑝(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−1 + 2𝑥, 
and the second derivative of 𝐷(𝑥) is given by 
 𝐷''(𝑥) = (𝑁 − 1)[𝑘𝑁𝑝(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−2 − 2]. 
Based on these preparations, we now study the interior equilibria of Eq. (3) in two situations. 
(a) Insufficient rewarding, 𝒑 < 𝟏/𝑵 
We use that 𝑓(𝑥) > 0 for all 𝑥 ∈ (0, 1) (Appendix B): thus, any interior equilibria of Eq. (3) 
must be located in (0,1). 
When 𝑘𝑁𝑝 ≤ 2, we need to distinguish two different cases. First, when 𝑘 > 1, 
𝐷'(0) = (𝑘 − 1)(1 − 𝑁𝑝) > 0 and 𝐷(0) = 0. Hence,  𝐷(𝑥) is positive near 𝑥 = 0. Since 
𝐷(1) = (1 − 𝑝)(𝑘 − 𝑁) < 0, and 𝐷''(𝑥) < 0, 𝐷(𝑥) has a unique interior root in (0,1). 
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Second, when 𝑘 = 1 , 𝐷'(0) = 0 . Since 𝐷''(x) < 0  and 𝐷(1) < 0 , 𝐷(x) < 0  for 0 < 𝑥 < 1; thus, 𝐷(𝑥) has no interior roots in (0,1). 
When 𝑘𝑁𝑝 > 2, 𝐷''(𝑥) = 0 for one 𝑥 ∈ (0,1), so 𝐷(𝑥) has a unique inflection 
point at 𝑥 = 𝑥� = 1 − (2/(𝑘𝑁𝑝)) 1𝑁−2 . Accordingly, 𝐷''(𝑥) > 0 for 0 < 𝑥 < 𝑥� , and 
𝐷''(𝑥) < 0  for 𝑥� < 𝑥 < 1 . 𝐷(𝑥)  is positive near 𝑥 = 0  (since 𝐷'(0) = (𝑘 − 1)(1 −
𝑁𝑝) > 0 and 𝐷(0) = 0), and 𝐷(1) < 0, hence 𝐷(𝑥) has a unique interior root in (0,1). 
We can thus conclude that for 𝑘 > 1 𝐺'(𝑥) and 𝐷(𝑥) have a unique interior root 𝑥�, 
and 𝐺(𝑥�) is the unique interior maximum of 𝐺(𝑥). Accordingly, solving the equation 
𝐺(𝑥) = 𝑐/𝑎 leads to the following conclusions: 
(1) When 𝐺(𝑥�) > 𝑐/𝑎, Eq. (3) has two interior equilibria, denoted by 𝑥1∗ and 𝑥2∗ 
with 𝑥1∗ < 𝑥2∗. Since 𝑥� is the unique interior root of 𝐷(𝑥), and since 𝐷(𝑥) is posi-
tive near 𝑥 = 0, 𝐷(𝑥) is positive for 0 < 𝑥 < 𝑥� and negative for 𝑥� < 𝑥 < 1. This 
implies that 𝑥1∗ is an unstable equilibrium and 𝑥2∗ is a stable equilibrium. 
(2) When 𝐺(𝑥�) = 𝑐/𝑎, Eq. (3) has only one interior equilibrium 𝑥�, which is a tangent 
point, and thus unstable. 
(3) When 𝐺(𝑥�) < 𝑐/𝑎, Eq. (3) has no interior equilibria. 
When 𝑘 = 1, 𝐷(𝑥) has no interior roots in (0,1) and 𝐷(𝑥) < 0, so 𝐺(𝑥) is mon-
otonically decreasing. Therefore, Eq. (3) has only a single stable interior equilibrium in (0,1). 
We can thus conclude that for 𝑁𝑝 < 1 the interior equilibria of Eq. (3) have the same 
structure (i.e., topology and stability) as those of the generalized volunteer’s dilemma without 
shared rewarding (Archetti and Scheuring, 2011). 
(b) Sufficient rewarding, 𝒑 > 𝟏/𝑵 
We use that 𝑓(𝑥) ≤ 0  for all 𝑥 ∈ (0, ?̅?]  (Appendix B): thus, 𝐹(𝑥)  is positive for 0 < 𝑥 ≤  ?̅?, and any interior equilibria of Eq. (3) must be located in (?̅?, 1).  
When 𝑘𝑁𝑝 ≤ 2, 𝐷''(𝑥) < 0 for ?̅? < 𝑥 < 1. Since 𝐷(?̅?) < 0 for 𝑁𝑝 > 1 (Appen-
dix C) and 𝐷(1) = (1 − 𝑝)(𝑘 − 𝑁) < 0, 𝐷(𝑥) has at most two roots in (?̅?, 1). 
When 𝑘𝑁𝑝 > 2, we need to distinguish two different cases. First, when ?̅? ≥ 𝑥� , 
𝐷''(𝑥) < 0 for ?̅? < 𝑥 < 1. Thus, 𝐷(𝑥) again has at most two roots in (?̅?, 1). Second, when 
?̅? < 𝑥� and 𝐷(𝑥�) ≥ 0, 𝐷(𝑥) has a single root in (?̅?, 𝑥�] (since 𝐷''(𝑥) > 0 and 𝐷(?̅?) < 0), 
and a single root in (𝑥�, 1) (since 𝐷''(𝑥) < 0 and 𝐷(1) < 0); thus, 𝐷(𝑥) has two roots in (?̅?, 1). When ?̅? < 𝑥� and 𝐷(𝑥�) < 0, 𝐷(𝑥) has no interior roots in (?̅?, 𝑥�), and at most two 
roots in (𝑥�, 1) (Since 𝐷''(𝑥) < 0 and 𝐷(1) < 0); thus,  𝐷(𝑥) has at most two roots in (?̅?, 1).  
We can thus conclude that for 𝑁𝑝 > 1 𝐷(𝑥) has at most two roots in (?̅?, 1), denoted 
by 𝑥�  and 𝑥�  with 𝑥� < 𝑥� . We then have 𝐷(𝑥) < 0  for 𝑥 ∈ (?̅?, 𝑥�) , 𝐷(𝑥) > 0  for 
𝑥 ∈ (𝑥�, 𝑥�), and 𝐷(𝑥) < 0 for 𝑥 ∈ (𝑥�, 1). Thus, 𝐺(𝑥�) is a minimum of 𝐺(𝑥) and 𝐺(𝑥�) is 
a maximum of 𝐺(𝑥). In addition, 𝑓(𝑥�) > 0 since 𝑥� > ?̅?, and 𝑓(𝑥) approaches zero from 
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above for 𝑥 → ?̅?  (Appendix B). As a result, we have lim𝑥→?̅?+ 𝐺(𝑥) > 𝐺(𝑥�) > 𝐺(𝑥�) >
𝐺(1) = 0. Accordingly, solving the equation 𝐺(𝑥) = 𝑐/𝑎 leads to the following conclusions 
(Fig. 1g): 
(1) When 𝐺(𝑥�) > 𝑐/𝑎 or 𝐺(𝑥�) < 𝑐/𝑎, Eq. (3) has only one interior equilibrium, 
denoted by 𝑥1∗. This equilibrium is stable, since 𝐷(𝑥1∗) < 0. 
(2) When 𝐺(𝑥�) = 𝑐/𝑎 or 𝐺(𝑥�) = 𝑐/𝑎, Eq. (3) has two interior equilibria, denoted 
by 𝑥1∗  and 𝑥2∗  with 𝑥1∗ < 𝑥2∗ . Specifically, for 𝐺(𝑥�) = 𝑐/𝑎 , 𝑥1∗  is stable, since 
𝐷(𝑥1∗) < 0, and 𝑥2∗ = 𝑥� is a tangent point (Pacheco et al., 2009; Souza et al., 2009). 
In contrast, for 𝐺(𝑥�) = 𝑐/𝑎, 𝑥2∗ is stable, since 𝐷(𝑥2∗) < 0, and 𝑥1∗ = 𝑥� is a tangent 
point. 
(3) When 𝐺(𝑥�) < 𝑐/𝑎 < 𝐺(𝑥�), Eq. (3) has three interior equilibria, denoted by 𝑥1∗, 
𝑥2
∗, and 𝑥3∗ with 𝑥1∗ < 𝑥2∗ < 𝑥3∗. Of these, 𝑥1∗ and 𝑥3∗ are stable, since 𝐷(𝑥1∗) < 0 
and 𝐷(𝑥3∗) < 0, whereas 𝑥2∗ is unstable, since 𝐷(𝑥2∗) > 0. 
When 𝐷(𝑥) has only one root or no roots in (?̅?, 1), 𝐺(𝑥) is monotonically decreas-
ing, since 𝐷(𝑥) ≤ 0. Therefore, Eq. (3) has only a single stable interior equilibrium in (?̅?, 1) 
(Fig. 1j). 
Appendix B: Analysis of the function 𝒇(𝒙) 
From the expression of 𝑓(𝑥) in Eq. (3c), we see that 𝑓(0) = 0 and 𝑓(1) = 1 − 𝑝 > 0. 
Moreover, 𝑓'(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑁𝑝(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−1  and 𝑓''(𝑥) = (𝑁 − 1)𝑁𝑝(1 − 𝑥)𝑁−2 . Thus, 
𝑓''(𝑥) > 0 for all 𝑥 ∈ (0,1). 
On this basis, we can draw the following conclusions for 𝑁𝑃 ≤ 1 and 𝑁𝑝 > 1. First, 
for 𝑁𝑝 ≤ 1 , 𝑓'(𝑥) > 0 , so 𝑓(𝑥)  is positive for all 𝑥 ∈ (0,1) . Second, for 𝑁𝑝 > 1 , 
𝑓'(0) = 1 − 𝑁𝑃 < 0. Hence, 𝑓(𝑥) is negative near 𝑥 = 0. Together with 𝑓(1) > 0 and 
𝑓''(𝑥) > 0 for all 𝑥 ∈ (0,1), this means that 𝑓(𝑥) has a single interior root ?̅? in (0,1). In 
addition, we have 𝑓(𝑥) > 0 for all 𝑥 ∈ (?̅?, 1). We also know that ?̅? < 𝑝, since 𝑓(𝑝) =
𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑁 > 0. 
Appendix C: Analysis of the sign of 𝑫(𝒙�) 
To determine the sign of 𝐷(?̅?) = ?̅?[𝑁𝑝 − 1 − (𝑁 − 1)?̅?] + 𝑘𝑓(?̅?) with 𝑓(?̅?) = 0, we need 
to know the relationship between ?̅? and 𝑥� = (𝑁𝑝 − 1)/(𝑁 − 1). According to Appendix B, 
𝑥� < ?̅? is equivalent to 𝑓(𝑥�) < 𝑓(?̅?) = 0, so 𝐷(?̅?) has the same sign as 
𝑓(𝑥�) = 𝑝 − 1
𝑁 − 1 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑁( 𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝑁. 
To evaluate the sign of 𝑓(𝑥�), we define the continuous function ℎ(𝑝) = 𝑓(𝑥�), and 
determine ℎ'(𝑝) and ℎ''(𝑝) as 
ℎ'(𝑝) = 1
𝑁 − 1 − ( 𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝑁(1 − 𝑝)𝑁−1(𝑁𝑝 + 𝑝 − 1) 
and 
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ℎ''(𝑝) = 𝑁( 𝑁
𝑁 − 1)𝑁(1 − 𝑝)𝑁−2(𝑁𝑝 + 𝑝 − 2). 
We thus see that ℎ(𝑝) has roots at 𝑝 = ?̂? = 1𝑁 and 𝑝 = 1, and has the unique maximum at 
?̂?  for 1𝑁 ≤ 𝑝 < 1  (since ℎ'( 1𝑁) = 0  and ℎ''( 1𝑁) < 0 ). Hence, ℎ(𝑝) < 0  for 𝑝 ∈ ( 1𝑁 , 1) , 
and thus, 𝐷(?̅?) < 0 for 𝑝 > 1𝑁. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Stationary fraction of volunteers. Shown are the stable equilibria (thick lines) and 
unstable equilibria (thin lines) as a function of the cost ratio 𝑐/𝑎 (left column), the threshold 
number 𝑘 of volunteers (centre column), and the group size 𝑁 (right column) for different 
values of the reward ratio 𝑝 (rows). Between the equilibria, the fraction of volunteers either 
increases (grey) or decreases (white) as a result of the evolutionary dynamics (this is also in-
dicated by arrows). Even without rewarding, a stable equilibrium exists with volunteers con-
stituting is a large fraction of the population (top row). However, depending on initial condi-
tions, the population may also approach the boundary equilibrium, where the fraction of vol-
unteers equals zero. As the reward ratio is increased (second row), a second interior equilib-
rium emerges, as the state of full defection becomes unstable (f). Increasing the reward ratio 
further reduces the range of parameter combinations for which population converges to a low 
proportion of volunteers, so that ultimately the only stable equilibrium is a state with a high 
proportion of volunteers (fourth row). Parameters: 𝑁 = 20 and 𝑘 = 10 in (a), (d), (g), and 
(j); 𝑁 = 20 and 𝑐/𝑎 = 0.12 in (b), (e), (h), and (k); 𝑘 = 10 and 𝑐/𝑎 = 0.12 in (c), (f), 
(i), and (l). 
Figure 2. Avoidance of defection traps due to a cusp bifurcation. Top: The interior equilibria 
of the system can be visualized as forming a single continuous surface in the 
three-dimensional space spanned by the cost ratio 𝑐/𝑎, the reward ratio 𝑝, and the equilib-
rium fraction of volunteers. For most parameter combinations (𝑐/𝑎, 𝑝), there is a unique sta-
ble equilibrium. However, when cost ratio and reward ratio are both small (front corner), the 
surface folds back onto itself and three interior equilibria are formed accordingly, of which 
the top and bottom ones are stable which the intermediate one is unstable, resulting in bista-
bility. The fold lines correspond to the parameter combinations at which saddle-node bifurca-
tions occur: at these, stable and unstable equilibria collide and annihilate each other. The lines 
of these saddle-node bifurcations thus mark the boundaries of the bistable region in parameter 
space. The two saddle-node bifurcation lines themselves collide in a cusp bifurcation (black 
circle). This cusp thus corresponds to the highest values of the cost and reward ratios at which 
the defection trap, corresponding to the lower stable equilibrium, exists. Also shown is the 
lower boundary equilibrium (bottom surface), whereas the upper boundary equilibrium has 
been omitted for clarity. Bottom: Dependence of cusp location (black circle) and bistable re-
gion (grey area) on cost and reward ratios, as a function of group size (rows) and threshold 
number of volunteers (columns). Shown are two-parameter bifurcation diagrams correspond-
ing to a top view of panel (a) (the saddle-node bifurcations delineating the bistable region are 
shown as black lines in these figures). As the threshold number of volunteers is increased 
and/or the group size is decreased, the cusp bifurcation (black circle) moves to higher values 
of the cost and reward ratio, and the bistable region (grey area) increases in size. 
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Figure 3. Differential performance of shared rewarding, depending on parameter values. Col-
or-coded is the critical reward ratio (top row), the equilibrium fraction of volunteers (middle 
row), and the relative gain of shared rewarding, computed as the equilibrium fraction of vol-
unteers divided by the critical reward ratio (bottom row), for different values of the group size 
(columns). Grey areas indicate parameter combinations for which the critical reward 
tio does not exist. Throughout most of the parameter space, the critical reward ratio is small 
compared to the total cost of contributing to the public good, and the resultant equilibrium 
fraction of volunteers is high. Shared rewarding is most efficient in the bottom row’s green 
regions. 
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